AWS IAM Roles and Ways to Use them to Improve Security - ParkMyCloud

AWS IAM Roles and Ways to Use them to Improve Security

What are AWS IAM Roles?

Within AWS Identity and Access Management system (IAM) there are a number of different identity mechanisms that can be configured to secure your AWS environment, such as Users, Groups, and AWS IAM Roles. Users are clearly the humans in the picture, and Groups are collections of Users, but Roles can be a bit more obscure. Roles are defined as a set of permissions that grant access to actions and resources in AWS. Unlike Users, which are tied to a specific Identity and a specific AWS account, an IAM Role can be used by or assumed by IAM User accounts or by services within AWS, and can give access to Users from another account altogether.

To better understand Roles, I like the metaphor of a hat.  When we say a Role is assumed by a user – it is like saying someone can assume certain rights or privileges because of what hat they are wearing.  In any company (especially startups), we sometimes say someone “wears a lot of hats” – meaning that person temporarily takes on a number of different Roles, depending on what is needed. Mail delivery person, phone operator, IT support, code developer, appliance repairman…all in the space of a couple hours.

IAM Roles are similar to wearing different hats this in that they temporarily let an IAM User or a service get permissions to do things they would not normally get to do.  These permissions are attached to the Role itself, and are conveyed to anyone or anything that assumes the role.  Like Users, Roles have credentials that can be used to authenticate the Role identity.

Here are a couple ways in which you can use IAM Roles to improve your security:

EC2 Instances

All too often, we see software products that rely on credentials (username/password) for services or accounts that are either hard-coded into an application or written into some file on disk. Frequently the developer had no choice, as the system had to be able to automatically restart and reconnect if the machine rebooted, without anyone to manually type in credentials during the rebootwhen the system rebooted. If the code is examined, or file system is compromised, then the credentials are exposed, potentially compromisingand can potentially used to compromise other systems and services. In addition, such credentials make it really difficult to periodically change the password. Even in AWS we sometimes see developers hard-code API Key IDs and Keys into apps in order to get access to some AWS service. This is a security accident waiting to happen, and can be avoided through the use of IAM Roles.

With AWS, we can assign a single IAM Role to an EC2 instance. This assignment is usually made when the instance is launched, but can also be done at runtime if needed. Applications running on the server retrieve the Role’s security credentials by pulling them out of the instance metadata through a simple web command. These credentials have an additional advantage over potentially long-lived, hard-coded credentials, in that they are changed or rotated frequently, so even if somehow compromised, they can only be used for a brief period.

Another key security advantage of Roles is that they can be limited to just the access/rights privileges needed to get a specific job done. Amazon’s documentation for roles gives the example of an application that only needs to be able to read files out of S3. In this case, one can assign a Role that contains read-only permissions for a specific S3 bucket, and the Role’s configuration can say that the role can only be used by EC2 instances. This is an example of the security principle of “least privilege,”, where the minimum privileges necessary are assigned, limiting the risk of damage if the credential is compromised. In the same sense that you would not give all of your users “Administrator” privileges, you should not create a single “Allow Everything” Role that you assign everywhere. Instead create a different Role specific to the needs of each system or group of systems.


Sometimes one company needs to give access to their resources to another company. Before IAM Roles, (and before AWS) the common ways to do that were to share account logins (with the same issues identified earlier with hardcoded credentials) or to use complicated PKI/certificate based systems. If both companies using AWS, sharing access is much easier with Role-based Delegation. There are several ways to configure IAM Roles for delegation, but for now we will just focus on delegation between accounts from two different organizations.

At ParkMyCloud, our customers use Delegation to let us read the state of their EC2, RDS, and scaling group instances, and then start and stop them per the schedules they configure in our management console.

To configure Role Delegation, a customer first creates an account with the service provider, and is given the provider’s AWS Account ID and an External ID. The External ID is a unique number for each customer generated by the service provider.

The administrator of the customer environment creates an IAM Policy with a constrained set of access (principle of “least privilege” again), and then assigns that policy to a new Role (like “ParkMyCloudAccess”), specifically assigned to the provider’s Account ID and External ID.  When done, the resulting IAM Role is given a specific Amazon Resource Name (ARN), which is a unique string that identifies the role.  The customer then enters that role in the service provider’s management console, which is then able to assume the role.  Like the EC2 example, when the ParkMyCloud service needs to start a customer EC2 instance, it calls the AssumeRole API, which verifies our service is properly authenticated, and returns temporary security credentials needed to manage the customer environment.


AWS IAM Roles make some tasks a lot simpler by flexibly assigning roles to instances and other accounts. IAM Roles can help make your environment more secure by:

  • Using the principle of Least Privilege in IAM policies to isolate the systems and services to only those needed to do a specific job.
  • Prevent hard coding of credentials in code or files, minimizing danger from exposure, and removing the risk of long-unchanged passwords.
  • Minimizing common accounts and passwords by allowing controlled cross-account access.

About Bill Supernor

Bill Supernor is the CTO at ParkMyCloud. Bill is a software and network engineering professional with 20 years of engineering and management experience in enterprise-grade software products, security, and networking. Prior to joining ParkMyCloud in 2017, Bill served as the CTO at KoolSpan, where he led the development of a globally deployed secure voice communication system for smartphones. He joined KoolSpan from Trust Digital, a leading provider of mobile device management products. Prior to Trust Digital, Bill served in senior-level positions at Cognio, Symantec, and McAfee/Network Associates. He also was an officer in the United States Navy.

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